











n the whole, labour force participation of
older workers is declining in the industrial-
ized countries, and in response to high unemploy-
ment, many countries expanded early retirement
schemes in the 1980s. Despite the common trend
toward earlier retirement, however, labour market
participation rates differ significantly across coun-
tries.The structure of labour markets and employ-
ment opportunities is particularly important.
Indeed, one of the more important current policy
challenges is that early retirement has become
commonplace in some countries, even though life
expectancy has risen sharply. This combination of
earlier retirement and longer life expectancy
results in a much longer span of inactivity.
Regardless of its causes, the withdrawal of older
workers from the labour force leads to an increase
in unused production capacity, a reduced tax base,
and a heavier load on pension and fiscal systems. If
the trend toward earlier retirement were to contin-
ue far into the future, it would pose even larger fis-
cal threats to pension systems,especially those that
do not include a penalty for
early retirement.
Another problem related to
that of early retirement is dis-
ability. While mortality rates
have been falling in the indus-
trialized countries, morbidity,
the inception rate of disability,
has declined more slowly.
Because morbidity increases
with age, the net effect of slow
improvements in morbidity and an aging popula-
tion has been a rise in the disabled population,
which is likely to increase yet further in the next
thirty years.Disability benefits are often more gen-
erous than ordinary retirement benefits, further
increasing the numbers of applicants as well as
claimants of disability benefits.
The steady withdrawal of workers from the work-
force at an ever younger age suggests that retire-
ment income is gradually increasing, and/or that
older workers are increasingly being forced out of
the labour market. Unlike his nineteenth-century
predecessor, the average worker today has accu-
mulated substantial wealth during his working life.
Moreover, incentives built into national social
insurance systems often encourage him to retire
early. The modern worker can not only afford to
retire early but is also willing to do so since recre-
ational opportunities have increased and the rela-
tive prices of leisure activities have decreased.
The trend toward earlier retirement and the relat-
ed issue of disability poses a substantial policy
challenge. Despite the political unpopularity of
reforming early retirement systems, several coun-
tries have already taken steps to tighten eligibility
rules and strengthen incentives to retire later.
However, even these additional incentives are
often weak or clash with supplementary pension
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Figure 1provision. Furthermore, in most countries, few
incentives exist to retire late, as reflected in low
labour force participation after the formal retire-
ment age.
In seventeen OECD countries, for which data is
available, the proportion of the 55-64 age cohort of
employed males fell by an average of more than
10 percentage points between 1980 and 1996, cf.
Disney and Whitehouse (1999). Similarly, as illus-
trated in Figure 1, labour force participation rates
for those 65 and above have fallen significantly
across all the economies in question.1
Although some of the decline in labour market
participation is a common trend across the OECD
countries, there remain substantial differences
across the countries with regard to the level of
labour market participation and its rate of decline.
For example Continental and Eastern Europe have
lower participation rates than the rest of the
OECD, but Iceland and Japan have particularly
high rates.
These differences are important for policy makers
to the extent that their causes are rooted in eco-
nomic policy and structure rather than in cultural
and environmental factors. However, deriving
causal relationships is difficult because early
retirement schemes were expanded in the 1980s in
many countries, as a way of reducing high youth
unemployment. It is therefore difficult to discern
whether the increase in early retirement resulted
from the early retirement schemes that were in
place or were simply an indirect consequence of
macroeconomic factors generating the high levels
of unemployment. Furthermore, many induatrial-
ized countries have in recent decades attempted to
boost job creation by reducing firing costs as Gilles
Saint-Paul of DELTA in Paris has pointed out. To
buy political support among incumbent workers,
unemployment benefits have been raised and
early-retirement programs implemented.
Costs of early retirement
The withdrawal of older workers from the labour
force creates a variety of economic challenges,
including an increase in unused production capaci-
ty. Herbertsson and Orszag (2001a) develop a sim-
ple framework to assess the cost of early retire-
ment of 55–64 year-olds in the OECD. Table 1
shows the fraction of output lost in the countries in
the period 1979–98.
The calculations correct for business cycled effects
by using relative labour participation as a bench-
mark. The total output gap due to a lack of full
labour force utilisation is considerably higher, as
indeed was noted in . The analysis suggests a cost
estimate of early retirement of 5–7 percent of
potential annually in the OECD, with higher fig-
ures in the EU.The exercise is not very sensitive to
reasonable variations in assumptions. This cost








Costs of early retirement in OECD countries as a share of potential GDP
in %
1980 1990 1998 1980 1990 1998
Hungary –– 15.9 Ireland – 6.9 7.4
Belgium – 15.2 13.5 Australia 7.5 7.5 6.9
Luxembourg – 12.5 13.0 Canada 5.5 6.7 5.7
Austria –– 12.3 Sweden 5.9 4.7 4.8
Germany 7.7 9.5 10.9 USA 5.8 5.4 4.7
Greece – 10.4 10.5 New Zealand – 7.9 4.7
Czech Republic –– 10.5 Turkey – 5.0 4.2
France 6.2 11.2 10.5 Japan 2.9 4.3 4.2
Netherlands 8.1 10.5 10.1 Norway 5.0 4.9 3.9
Poland –– 10.1 Switzerland –– 2.9
Finland 8.2 9.6 9.,7 Korea – 2.2 2.7
Spain 4.8 9.7 9.2 Mexico –– 2.6
Portugal 6.0 9.1 7.7 Iceland –– 0.5
Denmark – 6.9 7.7
UK – 7.5 7.6 OECD Average 5.8 6.7 6.3
Source: Herbertsson and Orzag (2001a).
1 The decline in labour force participation has reversed a bit in the
past few years. However, as points out, this is not unprecedented





in the mid-1980s, and have declined since, although
it is still not at the 1970s level. In light of the costs
associated with early retirement, it is useful to
summarize alternative theories on why people
retire early.
Why do people retire early?
The body of research on early retirement has
focused on the supply side of the labour market
and incentives thereof, (see Herbertsson, 2001a
and 2001b). Incentives such as wealth, accrual
rates,earnings tests,taxes,etc.,play a crucial role in
determining labour supply of older workers.
Boskin (1977) was one of the first to pay close
attention to the effects of incentives on early
retirement.Other subsequent work includes Quinn
et al. (1990). Indeed, incentives are the focus of a
huge body of US literature that includes papers by
Stock and Wise (1990) and Fields and Mitchell
(1984). Empirical work in Europe has also exam-
ined early retirement from an incentive-based
approach; examples include Börsch-Supan (1992)
for Germany and Meghir and Whitehouse (1992)
for the UK.
There are also a number of comprehensive studies
on incentives and early retirement. These include
work by the OECD (1995a; 1995b), which focuses
on incentives created on both the supply and the
demand side of the labour market, an EU project
published in the European Economy, and a NBER
book edited by Gruber and Wise (1999). The
methodology in each of these cases was slightly dif-
ferent.The EU study focuses on replacement rates
for different routes out of the labour market,
whereas the Gruber/Wise project highlights the
concept of pension wealth or accumulated pension
assets. The Gruber/Wise approach is notable
because it includes comparisons across a large
number of countries using the same methodology,
and its findings have spurred much policy and aca-
demic interest. However, the Gruber/Wise study
offers only limited insight into the pension systems
of the countries in question because it did not
incorporate the general impact of private benefits.
It is important to examine private benefits, partic-
ularly individual accounts with tax advantages,
when considering incentives for early retirement,
especially since individual accounts are sometimes
used to fund early retirement (see Herbertsson,
Orszag, and Orszag, 2000).
• Replacement rates.While the studies mentioned
above accurately characterize the incentive
issues and the structure of early retirement ben-
efits, causal explanation is lacking. It is general-
ly difficult to find evidence that can link a
microeconomic labour supply response to the
incentives in question, and it may well be that
weak incentives to continued work are a policy
response to labour demand shocks. For exam-
ple, Blöndahl and Scarpetta (1998) find no clear
relationship between high replacement rates
and early retirement. Johnson (2000), however,
has had greater success in his search. He reports
that historical data from thirteen industrialised
countries show a rapid fall in labour force par-
ticipation of male workers aged 60–64 after pen-
sions were extended to them. Johnson estimates
the participation elasticity to be – 0.06 with re-
spect to replacement rates – the average pen-
sion benefits of couples/average wages of male
ratio  – and 0.19 to the net-of-tax wage.
Furthermore, he estimates that the growth of
old-age insurance explains about 11 percent of
the reduction in labour force participation of
males aged 60–64 since 1920, and he concludes
by stating that greater private wealth probably
explains most of the remainder.
• Wealth effects. Costa (1998) reports that higher
private wealth, such as increased home owner-
ship,is the major explanation for the long down-
ward trend in labour force participation of
older-age male workers. Increased female
labour force participation might contribute to
more widespread early retirement of males, as
higher female participation adds to household
wealth. Costa surveys a number of studies on
early retirement in the US and reports an elas-
ticity of labour force non-participation with
respect to income (wealth) from disability, old
age and survivors pensions and assets. His con-
clusion is that the effect from a dollar in private
pension on retirement is very different from a
dollar in social security wealth, which in turn is
very different from a dollar in asset holdings.
Furthermore, Costa reports that the responsive-
ness of retirement to income has been falling in
the last century.
• Disability and unemployment benefits. The
importance of disability in explaining changes in
labour market participation is controversial.2 In
the US literature,many researchers have argued
2 Aarts and DeJong (1999) examine broad issues of disability with-
in a multipillar framework.that while disability benefits have led to
decreased labour market participation, the pri-
mary explanation lies elsewhere. Bound and
Waidmann (1992) use data on self-reported dis-
ability to conclude that only about a third of the
drop in labour force participation in US is due
to enhanced disability benefits. Bound (1989)
also casts doubts on how strong disincentive
effects disability insurance creates by looking at
the labour market behaviour of rejected appli-
cants. The literature on Europe, on the other
hand, often finds stronger disincentive effects
from disability insurance. This difference may
not be surprising, given that disability systems
are often more generous in Europe than in the
United States. It is a well known fact the mor-
bidity increases with longevity; consequently,
the average labour supply of older-age partici-
pants might decrease, as a greater proportion of
each generation will reach a higher age. This
could result in increased pressure on disability
and early retirement programs. Wealth effects
and, consequently, increased early retirement
can be created by disability pensions and special
unemployment benefits for the old, especially
low-income households. Disability benefits are
often substitutes for early retirement pensions
as a youth-unemployment reduction mecha-
nism. If this were the case, one would potential-
ly be able to find a relationship between non-
employment benefits, such as disability and
unemployment benefits, and unemployment.
However, Blöndahl and Scarpetta (1998) report
that, when comparing disability and unemploy-
ment benefits and unemployment, no apparent
relationship is to be seen between the levels of
non-employment benefits and unemployment,
neither in total nor elderly male unemployment.
• Recessions. Economic downturns affect early
retirement since the probability of becoming
unemployed rises during recession. Conse-
quently, people near retirement age are more
willing to leave the labour force and go into
early retirement. Lower real-wages during
recessions can also contribute to early retire-
ment since the opportunity cost of retiring
(measured in forgone wages) is lower during
recessions. A fall in asset prices during reces-
sions works in the opposite direction, as people
might postpone their retirement when private
wealth decreases.
• Design of pension schemes. Workers in public
defined benefit plans may have an incentive to
retire earlier than workers in defined contribu-
tion plans if the early retirement penalties are
too light, as they typically are.The exact effects
depend on the type of salary scheme that forms
the basis for the contributions and age-earning
profiles.The theory predicts that in systems with
high replacement ratios, workers would be
tempted to retire early. But, as is mentioned
above, not all empirical studies have been suc-
cessful in confirming this relationship. This can
be explained in part by the fact that, in some
countries, workers who retire early are
penalised by actuarial adjustments.On the other
hand, accrual rates at older ages seem to have a
significant impact on the retirement decision, cf.
Herbertsson and Orszag (2001b).
• Increased recreation opportunities. It is a well-
established fact that labour supply decisions
depend on the preference for leisure,which usu-
ally becomes stronger with higher income and
advanced age. Consequently, as private wealth
increases, the preferences for leisure become an
important motivation for leaving the labour
force. Not only can a greater number of older
workers afford to retire early, it has become
more socially acceptable to do so. Costa (1998)
reports that elasticity for recreation has
declined in the US since the turn of the century,
speculating that this decline was in part driven
by an increased demand for leisure fuelled by
rising incomes and by the increase in the variety
of low-cost leisure-time activities.
• Changing age structures. Because of the broad
dissemination of medical knowledge and declin-
ing fertility, the populations in industrialised
countries are constantly growing older. In-
creased longevity contributes to a fall in the rel-
ative supply of healthy workers. As life ex-
pectancy increases, more disabled people will
survive to adulthood,and a larger fraction of the
population will be disabled. For this reason
inactivity will rise with changing age structures.
I have now spelled out various explanations for
early retirement that can be traced to the supply
side of the labour market.Most of the explanations
evolve around planned-voluntary retirement deci-
sions.But early retirement can also be traced to the
demand side of the market and involuntary retire-
ment.A worker who enters the labour market at a
young age initially has a high probability of enter-
ing the unemployment pool, but the probability












responsibilities, and loses parental support. This
effect is more pronounced as the number of chil-
dren increases and the income of the spouse
decreases. However, with the passage of time, this
effect is reversed as the children leave home and
accumulated savings and pension rights create a
soft cushion in case of dismissal or voluntary quit-
ting. This development eventually leads to retire-
ment from the labour market. So a typical worker
begins and ends his labour-market participation by
depending on non-wage income in different forms.
• Age-structure. Job security rises with increased
tenure and hence, ceteris paribus, with age.
Herbertsson,Phelps,and Zoega (2001) report that
the unemployment rate of the young, 15–24 year-
olds, was higher than that of the older generations
in all of the OECD economies in 1998, except in
Germany, where unemployment of the age group
55+ is higher than in the youngest age groups.As
Lazear (1979) points out,if firms offer wages com-
mensurate with seniority rather than marginal
product, they might encourage older workers to
retire early or even lay them off before younger
workers.Since it is more difficult to dismiss an old
worker, the sensitivity of employment to shocks
could be a decreasing function of the size of the
older cohorts in an economy. The age structure
and the institutional framework may interact in
such way that the protection against dismissal
increases with age. However, firms may opt for
early retirement instead of dismissals; thus corpo-
rate restructuring would show up in lower labour-
force participation instead of unemployment.
Furthermore, a transitory shock is more likely to
lead to the dismissal of an older worker because of
his shorter expected post-depression tenure.Thus
the level of labour hoarding may be smaller for
the older workers due to their shorter remaining
work life. This would make the sensitivity to
shocks greater. Older workers may find it more
difficult to find another job, as their remaining
tenure is shorter.They may also be more resistant
to real wage moderation because their accumulat-
ed wealth reduces their dependence on employ-
ment.This raises the possibility that real-wage cuts
are less likely, as the proportion of older workers
is higher. They are therefore more likely to
become unemployed for the long term. As a
result, the higher the proportion of older workers
in the labour force, the more likely a transitory
shock is to have a persistent effect on employment
and push people into early retirement.
• Transitional effects. Older workers who started
their career in a growing industry might find
themselves in a declining industry as they near
the age of retirement.If older workers were laid
off, they would also find themselves competing
with better-educated and younger workers for
jobs in new and growing industries.As the aver-
age unemployment spell rises for all workers,
this might encourage older workers to go into
early retirement rather than continue their
search for new jobs – the discouraged worker
effect. Many countries have reacted to this
problem by designing programs that transfer
older workers from long-term unemployment
into retirement.
Shrinking labour forces and unemployment
The political environment in the 1980s was very
much influenced by the early-retirement-as-youth-
unemployment-reduction-mechanism doctrine and
the lump-of-labour-fallacy. It was widely believed
that in order to reduce youth unemployment older
workers had to leave the labour market to make
room for the young. Furthermore, early retirement
is closely connected to the age distribution. As
more people reach the age of early retirement,
defined here as the ages between 55 and 64, a
greater proportion of the populations is willing to
retire early.This is not only because of higher rates
of disability,wealth effects,and unemployment,but
also because in most leisure activities, one needs a
companion.The greater the pool of potential com-
panions, the higher the probability of early retire-
ment – you do not want to be the only one retiring
early.3 Also, the larger the fraction of people at an
early retirement age relative to the total popula-
tion, the greater the political pressure on imple-
mentation of early retirement schemes paid for by
the public – as the potential early retirees become
a stronger force in the political process. It is postu-
lated here that the development of many of the
early retirement schemes in Europe (and conse-
quently a decrease in the labour force participation
of older workers) can be traced to these facts.
Figure 2 shows the average age-specific unemploy-
ment rate in the OECD in the last three decades.
As can be seen from the figure, the unemployment
3 See Hurd (1988) and Johnson and Favreault (2001) for a discus-
sion of the joint retirement decisions of husbands and wives.rate is age dependent. As the workers enter the
labour force at young ages, there is a higher prob-
ability of being unemployed than at older ages.
Since it is more difficult to dismiss older workers,
the sensitivity of employment to shocks could be a
decreasing function of the size of older cohorts.
The age structure and the institutional framework
may interact in such a way that employment-pro-
tection legislation may be more effective as the
average age of workers increases.
Note that unemployment is highest for the 15–19 and
20–24 age groups.Surprisingly it is also higher for the
25–34 group than it is for the older groups.The group
over 55 has a slightly higher rate than the 35–55
group but the difference is only moderate.
Table 2 shows the effects of unemployment and
age structure on the labour force participation of
workers at early retirement
ages. Panel regressions were
conducted, using available data
from all OECD countries.
The first regression tests the
“early-retirement as a youth-
unemployment reduction mech-
anism” hypothesis, the second
and the third the “discouraged
worker effect” hypothesis, the
fourth the “older worker as a
pressure group” hypothesis, and
the fifth a mixture of the latter
two.
It is apparent from the table
that there is a strong relationship between youth
unemployment and labour force participation of
older workers.The negative sign in the first regres-
sion indicates that as more young males are unem-
ployed a greater number of older workers leave
the labour force.According to the point estimate, a
5-percentage point rise in youth unemployment
would reduce the labour force participation of
older workers by 1.5 percentage points. Similarly,
the discouraged worker effect seems to be strong.
Regressions (2) and (3) indicate that a 5 percent-
age point increase in elderly unemployment results
in a 2.5 percentage point reduction in the partici-
pation rate, ceteris paribus, and a 3 percentage
point reduction when total unemployment is used
as a regressor. Regression (4) supports the hypoth-
esis that older workers organize when they are rel-
atively many. A rise in the dependency ratio of
5 percentage points, which would of course take
many years,would,according to
our point estimate, reduce the
participation rate by 3.5 per-
centage points.
Conclusions
The withdrawal of older work-
ers from the labour force cre-
ates a variety of economic chal-
lenges, including an increase in
unused production capacity.
Costs due to early retirement
measured in terms of forgone
output averaged 6.3 percent of










Dependent variable, participation rate, 
males 55–64
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unemployment, males – 0.30
16–24 (6.37)
Unemployment, males – 0.51
55–64 (5.65)
Total male un- 0.60 0.55
employment (6.56) (5.98)
Dependency ratio – 0.71 – 0.58
65+/25–64 (4.13) (3.54)
R
2 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Note: Unbalanced panel of OECD countries, 1979–1998. Estimation method fixed
effects.
Source: Herbertsson (2001b).CESifo Forum 37
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uct in the OECD in 1998. These costs, which vary
greatly from country to country, are highest in
Hungary (15.9 percent of potential output) and
lowest in Iceland (0.5 percent). These differences
are important for policy makers to the extent that
their causes are rooted in economic policy and
structure rather than in cultural and environmental
factors.In light of these costs,this paper attempts to
summarize and discuss alternative theories on why
people retire early and how early retirement pro-
grams came about, in order to understand better
the roots of the problem.
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